Queening his Pawn
July 6, 2009

In our last post on Honduras (Chavez Chess) we discussed the fact that Chavez’s strategic goal is the elimination of the US presence at the Palmerola airbase. We also discussed the fact that he has a time constraint related to the pending elections in November, which might reasonably be viewed as an institutional exit to the crisis. This is his worst outcome as it would mean the local institutions were strengthened, not weakened. We are seeing actions with respect to both of these items already.

Today, Daniel Ortega for the first time called for the US to punish Honduras by dismantling the airbase.

Also, Chavez stated yesterday that he would not accept elections in November executed by the current regime. He thus in one step tries to adjust the game clock and also undermines the authority of all Honduran institutions.

The drama with respect to Zelaya’s re-entry is akin to Chavez trying to Queen a Pawn. If Zelaya is physically back on the ground in Honduras, the international community will only deal with him. It will have political cover to send in agents when he makes calls for “assistance.” The Hondurans seem to understand this, but it is unclear if they will be able to stop him by air, land and sea.

Chavez Chess
July 4, 2009

If technology is changing the political battle-space, how do we think about what is happening in Honduras? Starting with a framework that says this is a Chavez-led virtual offensive, what is he trying to achieve?

The offensive appeared to be a win/win proposition for him. In the event that Zelaya initially succeeded in winning a plebiscite (and most likely dismissing the existing Honduran institutions), Chavez of course would have established another client state. He also would have successfully tested the new US administration. Perhaps most importantly, he would have been well on his way to dislodging the US from its strategic air base (Palmerola) outside of the Honduran capital. This is particularly important since the airbase in Manta, Ecuador will not have its lease renewed by Chavez’s ally Correa this year. Without these two strong points, the US drug war and influence in the region will weaken materially.

In a slightly less successful scenario, the plebiscite process would lead to Honduran civil unrest or even civil war, and Chavez’s goals would also be advanced; the strongpoint would still be weakened. A proxy war also provides  a rallying point, a cause celebre to showcase Bolivarianism before the world, and in the medium term it would not matter if he actually won.

As much as Chavez’s plans were derailed by the expulsion of Zelaya, this middle scenario is still playing out. Zelaya’s martyr status before the UN is a public relations victory for Chavez. As a mere pawn, Zelaya may not know where he is sleeping from night to night, but Chavez is sleeping very well with the progress of events. More important than the public relations win, Chavez has already succeeded in putting distance between the US and Honduras. He has weakened the strongpoint. Having Obama on the record and on his side, of course, is the “coup” de grace.

When it is understood that Chavez wins in Honduras just by screwing things up, it becomes clear that the move to remove Zelaya from the country was tactically the correct one for Hondurans. The ejection still may not guarantee final victory, but the chances have been much improved. The fait accompli of an “on-the-record plebiscite” (whose illegitimacy would be forgotten) was avoided. Congress and other institutions have not been immediately dissolved to serve the “peoples will.” Instead, a unified institutional front has appeared to the world, and headlines are focused much more on Zelaya as a flawed individual than they otherwise would be. Meanwhile, Honduras controls the ground and the streets of Tegucigalpa, at least on the first turn.

In Chess, one maxim is to complicate things where you are losing or where your opponent is strong: shake things up. Conversely where you are winning or strong you should simplify things to force your advantage. By complicating the American strong point, Chavez makes a good strategic move. But by removing Zelaya and responding with unified institutions, the Hondurans made a strong and unexpected countermove. They “simplified” their home terrain.

The expulsion of Zelaya also changes the time dynamic in favor of Honduras. With a scheduled election only months away, the logic for allowing the new elections to solve the crisis will grow stronger. For this reason Chavez must move very quickly to reinstall Zelaya on the ground with some form of legitimacy, and along with this he must also create some chaos. (Incidentally, keeping up the pressure also serves as a useful global distraction that benefits his ally, Iran.)

A smooth institutional transfer of power is his worst case scenario. It means he will have been tactically defeated in this instance. But it also holds out a strategic threat. If the brave Hondurans can protect their institutions against his influence, perhaps Bolivians, Ecuadorans, and Nicaraguans will too. Perhaps, so will Venezuelans.

This brings us full circle to the question of what Chavez wants to achieve. Totalitarians are focused first and foremost on destroying other competing power centers in their home turf.  By nationalizing the private sector in Venezuela over time he has tightened his control of the important asset: oil. To maintain this control he must have a cause that provides cover, and expansionist Bolivarianism is the perfect “distraction.” A la 1984, a constant foreign war obscures a lower standard of living and a loss of civil rights. Any foreign setback, however, risks a backlash that could embolden domestic opposition in Venezuela. (This construct also works to explain expansionist mullahs in Iran).

So Chavez will keep the pressure on. Through all means possible he will create unrest in Honduras and otherwise undermine the new government’s legitimacy. He may have to spend a few more hours of oil production to fund this effort, but the mechanisms are in place. Already, foreign “labor” groups are forming at Honduras’s borders to demonstrate. These demonstrations will form a counter-weight in the press to the overwhelmingly pro-Micheletti demonstrations inside Honduras itself. They will also send a signal to the leaders of El Salvador and Guatemala as to how the wind is blowing in their own countries. By next week we should expect to have seen violence; he cannot afford to wait any longer.

Two Oceans
July 4, 2009

It is widely believed that technology is the great equalizer; Twitter nearly brought the mullahs to their knees. But Iran and Honduras are demonstrating that technology is changing the playing field in ways that may benefit tyranny more than democracy.

Latin America, for example, has been splintered for 200 years. The Amazon, the Andes, and the Central American Isthmus made it very difficult to project power across distance. But the internet has pulled these countries closer and, regardless of one’s opinion of his project, it is clear that Chavez has developed an effective method for expanding Venezuelan influence to other power centers.

Like a phage he injects petrodollars and propaganda into local economies, buys influence, and rewrites the constitutional DNA of weaker countries. The ejection of Zelaya demonstrates that the immune system of the Honduran political body has learned something from the experiences of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. But it is not clear if the patient will survive.

Why is this influence any different than has occurred in the past, and why does it aid tyranny rather than democracy? It is different than the past because the projection of soft power is now very efficient against democracies at a distance, but less so against controlled societies. Chavez does not need to invade when he can send cash to disgruntled lieutenants, mayors, and opposition figures. He provides them cover (under the banner of a “Bolivarian” revolution) and the means to plunder their neighbors. In the past it would have required agents on the ground to accomplish this mischief. But now the very system that Bolivarians and Islamists disparage (Open Capitalism and Democracy) now provides the transmission route for infection. Overcoming local loyalties requires constant communication and familiarity, not just cash. It is now possible for Chavez to court the opposition in remote mountains or across impassable forests. He can incite Kane against Abel at a distance.

In Nicaragua in 2006, Chavez bought the support of regional mayors by providing “discounted” oil in a direct negotiation. This tactic made an end-run around the national government and materially assisted Ortega’s election campaign. Chavez used the same arrangement to buy influence with Joe Kennedy (D) in New England.  In Honduras, control of the local oil distribution franchise was mediated via Chavez’s Petrocaribe.

In Honduran television, government spending for propaganda in favor of the “cuarta urna,” the fourth urn to hold a revolutionary plebiscite, was just $4 million. Venezuelan oil revenues are $20 billion or more in any given year. So Chavez’s annual budget can cover Honduran propaganda costs by about 2am on January 1st.

It should be noted that the US may not be immune from these effects. Campaign spending in the 2008 Presidential election totaled just over $1 billion (of which 2/3 was Obama and 1/3 McCain). Saudi oil revenues of over $130 billion mean that their budget could cover this amount by January 3rd. It is a commonplace among right wing blogs that online contributions to Obama from overseas have never been properly tracked. But one needn’t reach a verdict on this past election to understand that two oceans do not provide the protection they once did.

Iran, meanwhile, has gone quiet beneath a veil of repression, also funded by oil.